We investigate the reverse mathematical strength of Turing determinacy up to Σ 0 5 which is itself not provable in second order arithmetic.
Introduction
Reverse mathematics endeavors to calibrate the complexity of mathematical theorems by determining precisely which system P of axioms are needed to prove a given theorem Θ. This is done in one direction in the usual way showing that P Θ. The other direction is a "reversal" that shows that relative to some weak base theory Θ P . Here one works in the setting of second order arithmetic, i.e. the usual first order language and structure M, +, ×, <, 0, 1 supplemented by distinct variables X, Y, Z that range over a collection S of subsets of the domain M of the first order part and the membership relation ∈ between elements of M and S. Most of countable or even separable classical mathematics can be developed in this setting based on very elementary axioms about the first order part of the model M, an induction principle for sets and various set existence axioms. At the bottom one has the weak system of axioms called RCA 0 that correspond to recursive constructions. One typically then adds additional comprehension (i.e. existence) axioms to get other systems P . Many of these systems are given by Γ comprehension (Γ-CA 0 ) which is gotten from RCA 0 by adding on the axiom that all sets defined by formulas in some class Γ exist. So one gets ACA 0 for Γ the class or arithmetic formulas and Π 1 n -CA 0 for Γ the class of all Π 1 n formulas. (In each case the formulas may contain set parameters.) Full second order arithmetic, Z 2 , is the union of all the Π 1 n -CA 0 . The standard text here is Simpson [2009] to which we refer the reader for general background.
This paper is concerned with the analysis of various principles connected with axioms of determinacy. This subject has played an important role historically as an inspiration for increasingly strong axioms (as measured by consistency strength) both in reverse mathematics and set theory. We have given a brief overview of this history in §1 of Montalbán and Shore [2012] (henceforth denote by MS [2012] ) and refer the reader to that paper for more historical details and other background for both reverse mathematics and determinacy. Here we give some basic definitions and cite a few results. [ω] . It is a wining strategy if any play f following it (i.e. f (n) = s(f n) for every even (odd) n) is a win for for I (II). We say that the game G A is determined if there is a winning strategy for I or II in this game. If Γ is a class of sets A, then we say that Γ is determined if G A is determined for every A ∈ Γ. We denote the assertion that Γ is determined by Γ determinacy or Γ-DET.
Definition 1.1 (Games and Determinacy
The classical reverse mathematical results are (essentially Steel [1976] see also Simpson [2009 V.8] ) that Σ 0 1 -DET is equivalent to ATR 0 a system asserting the existence of transfinite iterations of arithmetic comprehension that lies strictly between ACA 0 and Π 1 1 -CA 0 ; and (Tanaka [1990] ) that Π (Tanaka [1991] , MedSalem and Tanaka [2007] and Welch [2011] ) show that they are significantly stronger with the last provable in Π 1 3 -CA 0 but not Δ 1 3 -CA 0 . Friedman [1971] in what was really the first foray into reverse mathematics, proved that Σ 0 5 -DET is not provable in full second order arithmetic and Martin [1974a] , [n.d.] improved this to Σ 0 4 -DET.
In MS [2012] we delineated the limits of determinacy provable in Z 2 as encompassing each level of the finite difference hierarchy on Π 0 3 sets. Indeed each level n of the this hierarchy is provable from Π 1 n+2 -CA 0 but not at any lower level of the comprehension axiom hierarchy. (So the union of the hierarchy (which is far below Δ 0 4 ) is not provable in Z 2 .) Then, in Shore [2014] (hereafter MS [2014] ) we analyzed the consistency strength of all these statements, getting a much clearer picture. In this paper we analyze, to the extent we can, the reverse mathematical strength of a variation on determinacy where one is thinking of the underlying space as the Turing degrees in place of 2 ω or ω ω .
). We denote by Γ Turing determinacy or Γ-TD the assertion that every degree closed A ∈ Γ is determined. Remark 1.4. For any reasonable Γ including each of the Σ 0 n classes, it is clear that Γ-DET is equivalent (in RCA 0 ) toΓ-DET whereΓ = {Ā|A ∈ Γ}. So we can use these two assertions interchangeably and similarly for Γ-TD. We also note that while it is easy to code sets as functions recursively (and so determinacy or Turing determinacy for classes in ω ω imply the corresponding result for 2 ω ) the converse is not obvious at the very lowest level. However, for any of the arithmetic classes at or above Δ 0 3 , it does not matter for determinacy or Turing determinacy if we work in 2 ω or ω ω as we can code functions in ω ω by sets in 2 ω as long as we include the Π 0 2 condition that the sets are infinite. So once we are at that level we work in whichever setting is more convenient.
It is a classical theorem of Martin that a degree closed set A is determined if and only if it contains a cone, i.e. a set of Turing degrees of the form {x|x ≥ z} for some degree z called the base of the cone or is disjoint from a cone. (In the first case I has a winning strategy; in the second, II.) In the realm of set theory, this induces a 0 − 1 valued measure on sets of degrees (with measure 1 corresponding to containing a cone). This result is the basis for many interesting set theoretic investigations. The question of the relationship between determinacy axioms and Turing determinacy axioms is an interesting one in the set theoretic setting. Perhaps the most striking early result is that for Γ = Σ 1 1 the two notions coincide and and are equivalent with the axiom asserting the existence of x # for every x ∈ ω ω (Martin [1970] and Harrington [1978] ). At the level of determinacy for all sets, later work by Woodin showed that for full determinacy and Turing determinacy are not only equiconsistent but are equivalent (over DC) in L(R).
(See Koellner and Woodin [2010 and other articles in the same handbook] for this and much more on the role of TD in set theory.) The main results for Turing determinacy at lower levels of the arithmetic hierarchy show some differences from full determinacy at the same levels. There are a few classical ones given in Harrington and Kechris [1975] , primarily from recursion theoretic or ZFC points of view and Martin [1974] and [n. d.] from the viewpoint of working in ZFC without the power set axiom and replacement only for Σ 1 formulas.
Their results either directly, or can be refined to, give ones in reverse mathematics. In this paper we present them from the viewpoint of reverse mathematics and fill in some of the gaps. We begin with determining how much Turing determinacy is provable in weak systems. The base theory RCA 0 proves Π . There are various formulations and we state a couple of variants. That this theorem can be proven for n ∈ ω in ACA 0 with some extra recursion theoretic conclusions is due to MedSalem and Tanaka [2007] . Our notation is slightly different from theirs. It follows more closely that used by Martin [1974 Martin [ , 1974a Martin [ , 1974b . We also incorporate a few normalizations of the sequences that appear in different presentations. This theorem allows us to prove Δ 0 3 -TD at the expense of moving from RCA 0 to ACA 0 (Theorem 2.6). We point out that there can be no reversals from any Turing determinacy assumption to any system stronger than RCA 0 . The key fact here is that the standard model of RCA 0 with just the recursive sets (or the sets recursive in any X) is obviously a model of Γ-TD for any Γ. Thus we can hope for implications from any Γ-TD only over stronger systems. In this case, we can, however, prove that Δ 0 3 -TD is not provable in RCA 0 (Proposition 2.8). This supplies a natural principle that lies strictly between RCA 0 and ACA 0 but does not imply the existence of a nonrecursive set.
We next move on to Σ 0 3 -TD. Combining the implication from ATR 0 to Σ 0 1 -DET (Steel [1976] in RCA 0 ) and from Σ 0 1 -DET to Σ 0 3 -TD (Harrington an Kechris [1975] ) we see that ATR 0 Σ 0 3 -TD. In this case, we prove a reversal over ACA 0 (Theorem 3.7). This supplies an example of a natural theory strictly weaker than ATR 0 (and indeed does not even imply the existence of a nonrecursive set) but which joins ACA 0 up to it. In particular, Σ 0 1 -DET is equivalent to Σ 0 3 -TD over ACA 0 . Using the representation of Theorem 1.5, we can now hope to prove Δ 0 4 -TD in ATR 0 . We do so in Theorem 3.3 but we need an additional induction axiom. Definition 1.7. For S a class of formulas, S transfinite induction, S-TI, is the scheme of axioms stating that for every well-ordering α (formally coded as a set X of ordered pairs β, γ prescribing its ordering relation < X on its domain which is also a subset of ω) and every formula ϕ ∈ S,
The version that we need to prove Δ 0 4 -TD over ACA 0 in Theorem 3.3 is Π 1 1 -TI 0 . Over ACA 0 this axioms scheme is equivalent to the dependent choice axiom for Σ 1 1 formulas (Simpson [2009, VIII.5.12] ) and so provable in Π Harrington and Kechris [1975] , Martin [1974] and Welch [2011] to show that Π 1 3 -CA 0 proves both. We can have no meaningful reversal even over relatively strong systems. Even full Borel determinacy can prove neither Δ Finally, we use these methods to derive Martin's result that Σ 0 5 -TD implies the exis-
-TD implies the consistency of Z 2 (and more) and so takes us well beyond the reach of full second order arithmetic (Corollary 4.6).
We close this section with some notational conventions. σˆτ, σˆf, σ, τ σ, f σ, X , f, g , u, v, w = u, v, 
w in the usual way. The precise formulations do not matter as long as they are done recursively.
We assume a basic familiarity with recursive ordinals and the hyperarithmetic hierarchy and at times their formal development in ATR 0 as in Simpson [2009, VII] . Note also that we generally prove theorems in their lightface version and leave relativization to the reader unless some desired uniformity is brought out by carrying along the set parameter.
The trivial levels
In this section we prove Π 0 2 -and Δ 0 3 -Turing Determinacy. Only the first proof is carried out in RCA 0 . It is helpful to introduce a weaker but more easily definable notion of closure than under ≡ T .
Here and elsewhere σ is in ω <ω or 2 <ω appropriate. The smallest sufficiently closed set containing f is the sufficient closure of f . Let E be the set of even strings, i.e. those whose nonzero values occur only at even numbers such as all initial segments of 2 × f for any f .
Remark 2.2. Note that, for every
Also, for any A ⊆ 2 ω , the setÂ = {X : (∀σ, k)(σˆ(k × X)) ∈ A} is sufficiently closed. The advantage of using sufficient closure instead of Turing closure is that if A is Π 0 2 , then so isÂ.
which is sufficiently closed is either empty or contains an element of every Turing degree above Z.
Proof. Let A = ∅ be such a set. There is then an r.e. operator W (given by some
(where W Z⊕σ only runs for |σ| many steps and σ − = σ |σ| − 1). So, we have that f ∈ A if and only if f n ∈ X for infinitely many n.
Now, given any infinite Y ∈ 2 ω with Z ≤ T Y , we build an h ∈ A, with h ≡ T Y . We construct h as the union of finite initial segments ∅ = σ 0 ⊆ σ 1 ⊆ · · · all of even length.
We just need to make sure that h meets X infinitely often and is of the same Turing degree as Y . Suppose we have σ s . Let τ s be the first τ ∈ E found in a standard search recursive in Z such that σ sˆτ ∈ X. Let k s be least such that |σ sˆτ sˆ0 ks | = 2 x, y s + 1 for y s the sth element of Y and some x. Now set σ s+1 = σ sˆτ sˆ0 ksˆ1 . Clearly h ≤ T Y (by construction as Z ≤ T Y ), h ∈ A and Y ≤ T h (its members can be read off in order from the list of odd numbers m such that h(m) = 1) as required.
As degree-invariant sets are obviously sufficiently closed we have the following corollaries.
Corollary 2.4. For every
Proof. Let A be a Δ Z 3 degree invariant subset of 2 ω . By Theorem 1.5, there is a decreasing, continuous sequence
and, by Remark 2.2, sufficiently closed and so dense. By Lemma 2.3, eachÂ ξ is either ∅ or contains a member Y of every degree above that of Z.
Note that as the A ξ are continuous, so are theÂ ξ : Consider any limit ordinal λ. If X ∈Â λ then its sufficient closure is contained in A λ and so in every A ξ for ξ < λ and thus in ∩{Â ξ |ξ < λ}. On the other hand, if X ∈Â ξ for every ξ < λ, then its sufficient closure is contained in eachÂ ξ ⊆ A ξ and so in A λ and inÂ λ . Thus ξ cannot be a limit ordinal by the Baire category theorem. (TheÂ ξ are dense Π Note that by Remark 1.4 the corollary holds in ω ω as well as 2 ω . From now on we will be concerned with Turing determinacy at levels above Δ 0 3 and so work in whichever setting is more convenient.
We conclude this section by showing that Δ 0 3 -TD is not provable in RCA 0 . If we are looking for a standard model of RCA 0 in which Δ 0 3 -TD fails we have serious restrictions on the method of attack. Suppose the formulas (with parameter Z) defining a Δ 0 3 set A of reals determining a game in a standard model M actually define a Δ 0 3 set of reals in the universe or even in any extension of the sets of M to a model of ACA 0 . In this case, Theorem 1.5 provides a representation of A in the extension and Lemma 2.6 applies. Its conclusions, however, are clearly absolute downwards to M and so the given game is determined in M. Thus the only hope of finding a standard model counter-example is to consider formulas which define a Δ Proof. We follow the proof of Harrington and Kechris [1975, §2] but make explicit a property of their construction that we will need in the proof of Theorem 3.3. Let a given game be specified by a Σ 0 3 degree invariant subset of ω ω , B = {f |∃i∀j∃kR(i, j,f (k))} where R is a recursive predicate andf (k) is the sequence f (0), . . . , f(k − 1) . We define a Π 0 1 set A which has members of the same degrees as B:
there is an i such ∀j∃kR(i, j,f (k)) and so a g ≤ T f such that i, f, g ∈ A. Thus A and B have elements of exactly the same degrees.
We
Now apply Π 0 1 -determinacy (which follows from ATR 0 as in Simpson [2009, V.8.2] ), to the game specified by C. If I has a strategy s then, we claim that every degree t ≥ s has a representative in A: As usual, let I play s against any real t ∈ t. The resulting play s(t), t has degree t and is in C and so of the form i, f, g , h with g ∈ A and i, f, g , h ≡ T g as required. Thus, in this case, as B is degree invariant, it contains a cone with base the strategy for I in the game specified by C. On the other hand, if II has a strategy s for this game, we claim that B is disjoint from the cone above s. If not then there is aĝ ∈ B and hence one g ∈ A which computes s. Suppose Φ g i = s. Let f (n) ≤ T g be the number of steps it takes Φ g i (n) to converge and h be II's play following his supposedly winning strategy given by Φ g i = s against I playing i, f, g . It is clear from the definitions that the play of this game is i, f, g , h and it is in C for the desired contradiction.
We now calculate the complexity of the property of a Σ 0 3 degree invariant subset of ω ω containing a cone. We use this calculation in the proof of Theorem 3.3. Proof. Represent a given Δ 0 4 degree invariant set B ⊆ 2 ω using the difference hierarchy on Σ 0 3 sets as in Theorem 1.5. By Remark 1.6, we may assume that each B ξ , ξ ≤ α is itself Turing invariant and so (by Theorem 3.1) either disjoint from a cone or contains one. As B α = 2 ω and the B ξ are increasing, there is, by Proposition 3.2 and Π 1 1 -TI 0 , a least γ such that B γ contains a cone. If γ is a successor ordinal, then we have a cone disjoint from B γ−1 and contained in B γ . Depending on the parity of γ, this cone is either disjoint from, or contained in, B as required.
To finish the proof we show that γ cannot be a limit. For each ξ < γ, let A ξ be a Π 0 1 set reals with members of the same Turing degrees as B ξ and C ξ the associated Π 0 1 set as defined in Theorem 3.1. Consider the Π 0 1 game specified by C = { ξ, i , f, g , h | i, f, g , h ∈ C ξ }, i.e. I first chooses a ξ and then plays the game determined by C ξ . If I has a winning strategy in this game, say his first move is to play ξ, i . The rest of his strategy then gives him a wining strategy in C ξ which (by the proof of Theorem 3.1) would be the base of cone in B ξ contrary to the assumption that it is disjoint from a cone. Thus (by Π 0 1 -DET), II has a strategy s for the game specified by C. Restricting I to play a given ξ < γ as the first part of his first move gives a strategy s ξ for II in C ξ uniformly recursive in s. As, by the proof of Theorem 3.1, each s ξ is the base of a cone disjoint from B ξ , s is the base of a cone disjoint from all the B ξ for ξ < γ and so disjoint from B γ = ∪ ξ<γ B ξ for the desired contradiction.
We now prove that one cannot get Δ 0 4 -TD from ATR 0 alone. A crucial ingredient is H. Friedman's [1967, II] ω-incompleteness theorem (see Simpson [2009, VIII.5.6] ). Note that a countable coded ω model specified by a set M is a structure for second order arithmetic in which the numbers are the numbers (in the ambient universe) and its sets are the columns (M) n = {x| x, n ∈ M}. 
We now let T be the theory containing T 0 with new constants M n and assertions saying that for all n, the M n are countable coded ω-models of S n and that M n is a member of M n+1 (in the sense that as a set it is coded in M n+1 by being one of the columns of M n+1 ). Any finite subset of T is satisfied by one of the M n just constructed. (Unravelling the definitions of T n and S n shows that any model M n+1 of S n+1 contains an M n S n and so by induction a sequence of M i for i < n as required in T .) Thus there is a modelN of T . (Note that this model is only given by a compactness argument so is expected to be nonstandard.)
We now consider the ω-submodel N ofN specified by taking as its second order part all sets coded in any of the M n inN . First note that N ATR 0 : If there is a wellordering α in N then it is a member of some M n ⊂ N and so also well-ordered in M n . If we have any arithmetic predicate S for which we want a hierarchy to witness ATR 0 in N , consider the same formula interpreted in M n (which we may assume contains the set parameters in S as well as α). As M n ATR 0 , the desired hierarchy of sets exists in M n . As the properties required of it are arithmetic they hold in N as well.
We now define, in N , degree invariant classes A, B ⊂ N : A = {X| the least n, such that X does not compute both an M S n and its satisfaction predicate, is even} and B = {X| the least n, such that X does not compute both an M S n and its satisfaction predicate, is odd}. Clearly A and B are disjoint. We claim that A ∪ B = N . Consider any X ∈ N so X ∈ M i for some i. We see, by the definition of the M n , that no member of M i can be an M S i and so no such is computable from X. (If M ∈ M i and M S i then, by the definition of S i , M T i−1 but , again by the definition of S i , M i ¬∃M T i−1 for the desired contradiction.) Thus there is some n ∈ ω and so a least one such that no M computable from X can be a model of S n . (Notice that if X ∈ M i computes a model M then, as M i is a model of ATR 0 , the satisfaction predicate for M is also in M i .) Thus X ∈ A ∪ B as required. Next, we claim that both A and B are unbounded in the Turing degrees of N . The point here is that M n S n but it and every model M computable from it together with its satisfaction predicate is in M n+1 and so M S n+1 . Thus M n ⊕ Sat(M n ) ∈ A for n odd and M n ⊕ Sat(M n ) ∈ B for n even where Sat(M) is the full satisfaction predicate (elementary diagram) for M. Of course, the degrees of the M n are cofinal in those of N for both the even and odd n.
All that remains to see that A is a counterexample to Δ 4 -TD in N is to show that it (and analogously B) is Σ 
. Thus we are left with analyzing the rest of the relations in the formula.
Any set Z can be effectively viewed as a sequence of its columns (Z) n and the associated structure for second order arithmetic is given by specifying the (Z) n = {m| n, m ∈ X} as its second order part. The first order part remains the same as in the ambient universe. So each Z is, in this way, recursively interpreted as an ω-model. That V is the satisfaction predicate for the model coded in this way by Z is then a Π Next we prove a reversal of Theorem 3.1 over ACA 0 . We begin by pointing out that a standard fact on iterations of the Turing jump holds in ACA 0 . Proof. If α is a successor ordinal, the result follows immediately from ACA 0 . Otherwise, say α is a limit ordinal. The function f taking η < α to the least e satisfying the conditions of the Lemma is total by hypothesis and exists by ACA 0 . Indeed, f ≤ T X . The set { n, η |Φ X f (e) (n) = 1} then also exists, satisfies the definition of 0 α and is recursive in X . Proof. Let α be a well-ordering. We want to prove that 0 α exists. Let W be a low nonrecursive REA operator, i.e. ∀X(
) and the indices for the required Turing reductions are the same for all X. (The standard construction for such an operator clearly works in ACA 0 .)
Consider the set P = {X|(∃β < α)(0
rewrite its defining condition by saying that there is a β < α and an e such that Φ
is a total characteristic function for a set that satisfies the Π 0 2 defining condition for 0
predicate (uniformly). Thus the condition defining P is Σ 0 3 . LetP be the Turing closure of P , i.e.P = {X|∃Y (Y ∈ P & X ≡ T Y ). Similarly,P ∈ Σ 0 3 . By Σ 0 3 -TD there is a cone of degrees inP or its complement. LetX be a set in the base of such a cone. IfX ∈P let X ≡ TX be in P . If not, let X =X. By Lemma 3.6, it suffices to prove that 0 η ≤ T X for every η < α to get that 0 α exists. If not, then, by ACA 0 , there is a least γ < α such that 0 γ T X. Note that, again by Lemma 3.6, 0 γ exists. We now work toward a contradiction.
If X ∈ P , let β < α be as required in the definition of P and so by the leastness of γ, γ ≤ β (and 0 By Posner and Robinson [1981, Theorem 3 relativized to X], which can easily be proven in ACA 0 , there is aŶ such that X < TŶ and X ≡ TŶ ≡ TŶ ⊕X ⊕0 γ . By our choice of W ,Ŷ < T WŶ < TŶ . On the other hand, our assumptions guarantee thatŶ ∈P and so that there is a Y ∈ P with Y ≡ TŶ . Let δ be the witness for Y being in
Finally, suppose X / ∈ P . As 0 γ T X, we have, again by Posner and Robinson, a
By pseudojump inversion for REA operators (Jockusch and Shore [1984] ), which can also easily be proven in ACA 0 , there is an Z with
γ is a witness that Z ∈ P ⊆P . This is the desired final contradiction toX being the base of a cone outside ofP and so to the existence of γ as required. We now prove generalizations to all levels of the arithmetic hierarchy of weaker versions of Theorems 3.1 and 3.3 due to Harrington and Kechris [1975] and Martin [1974] , respectively. We prove the first in RCA 0 and the second in Π 1 1 -CA 0 .
Σ

Lemma 4.1 (essentially Harrington and Kechris
Proof. We follow the proof of Theorem 3.1. Given a Σ 
The analysis to show that B contains or is disjoint from a cone is now exactly as in Theorem 3.1.
Lemma 4.2 (essentially Martin
Proof. As Δ n -TD each of these sets either contains or is disjoint from a cone. By Δ 1 2 -CA 0 we have the sequence telling us which is the case. We may then take the least γ such that A γ contains a cone (A α = 2 ω if no other). Now by Σ 1 2 -AC 0 we have a sequence s η of bases of cones disjoint from A η for η < γ. The degree of this sequence is then the base of a cone disjoint from all the A η for η < γ. Its join with the base of a cone contained in A γ is then the base of a cone contained in or disjoint from A depending on the parity of γ. 
As Π
which implies that β 0 does not exist.
We first We now define a Σ 0 5 set and so a game Q using the same r.e. operator W as in the proof of Theorem 3.7 as well as some notions from MS [2014] . As there, we consider complete extensions of T defined from the play of the game whose term models are ω-models (albeit in ways more complicated than simply being the plays of the two players). (The term model of such an extension is the structure whose members are (equivalence classes) of formulas ϕ(x) which, in the appropriate theory, define unique elements. It is an ω-model if its natural numbers are the terms x = 1 + 1 + . . . + 1.)
The idea of the following definition is that Q is the set of all X such that there is a completion of T with degree W X which is "better" than all completions of degree X. Here, the "better" of two completions is the one whose term model is either well-founded or has a larger well-founded part than the other. 
The set Q is thus Σ 
Let L β be the well-founded part of M I . We cannot have β > α because we would then Second, we find another degree X ≥ T Z which is in Q and hence inQ.
Since M I is well-founded, whatever A I is, On M I \On A I is always either empty or has a least element.
Thus, we have T h α / ∈Q and X ∈Q with both above z, the supposed base of a cone inside or disjoint fromQ, for the final contradiction. Proof. We assume, for the sake of a contradiction, that α 2 does not exist. We extend the theory T of MS [2014, §2] by setting
By the same proof as in the second paragraph of the proof of Lemma 2.1 of MS [2014] (or at the beginning of the proof of Lemma 4.4 above), if α 2 does not exist then
is unbounded in the ordinals. We now define a set P which plays the role of Q in the previous proof. Again, P is the set of all X such that there is a model of T of degree W X which is better than any of degree X, but this time we need P to be Σ
&T is a complete extension of T whose term model M II is an ω-model → conditions R I new or R I 3 hold)]}. The conditions R I new and R I 3 are defined in Section 2 of MS [2014] . Instead of repeating the whole background developed there, we just use a few lemmas from that section to prove below the few properties we need. Before doing that, let us notice that since every element of M I and M II is definable by a real (because T says that every set is countable), we can compare their elements by looking at the reals coding them. Thus, when we say M I ⊆ M II , we mean that every element of M I is coded by a real in M I which also belongs to M II . (As both models are standard, we can confidently talk about reals, i.e. subsets of ω, being in one or both of them.) The main properties about R I new, R I 3, and R II 3 are the following: The rest of the proof is similar to that of the previous lemma. To see that P is Σ Second, we find a degree X ≥ T Z which is in P , and hence inP . As Z ≤ T T h α , there is (by pseudojump inversion) an X > T Z such W X ≡ T T h α . We claim that X ∈ P .
LetT = T h α with term model M I = L α . Consider anyT ≡ T X with term model M II as in the definition of P . So, we have that M II = L α because their theories have different Turing degrees, and we have that (T h(M II )) ≡ T (T h α ) because W X is low over X. By Claim 4.5, M II is ill-founded and its well-founded part is at most L α . If A II = L α , then M I is isomorphic to the well-founded part of M II , and hence R I new holds. Otherwise, M I and M II are incomparable. Since R II 3 does not hold (because M II is well-founded) R I 3 must hold, proving that X ∈ P .
As T h α , X ≥ T Z, we see that z is not the base of a cone forP for the final contradiction and so α 2 exists as required.
